ClaimRush

Activity-Routed Ownership Protocol Design

A treasury-free Crown economy where onchain activity routes player-contributed value to Kings and long-term lockers

Document version	v1.0.0
Protocol reference version	ClaimRush v1.0.0 architecture
Date	June 17, 2026
Status	Final whitepaper
Network	Base
Token	CLAIM

Disclaimer

This document describes the design, mechanics, and intended economic structure of ClaimRush.

ClaimRush is a paid onchain game. Participation involves real financial risk. Users may lose ETH, CLAIM, gas fees, liquidity value, or locked-position value. Royalties, bonuses, emissions, prices, liquidity, and player activity are variable and not guaranteed.

This document is not investment advice, financial advice, legal advice, tax advice, or a promise of profit. Nothing in this document should be interpreted as an offer to sell, a solicitation to buy, or a guarantee of future protocol activity, token value, yield, or returns.

Abstract

ClaimRush is an onchain Crown game built around two connected loops: the Crown loop and the Furnace loop.

In the Crown loop, players pay ETH to take the Crown, become King, and mine CLAIM while holding it. When dethroned, the previous King receives 75% of the next takeover ETH and the CLAIM mined during the reign. Mined CLAIM is settled as a liquid slice plus a force-locked veCLAIM remainder, with the liquid fraction set by the King's share of recent Crown activity (see Section 3.1).

In the Furnace loop, players lock CLAIM into veCLAIM and become Barons. Barons earn from the remaining 25% of every takeover ETH, distributed according to their share of total veCLAIM.

ClaimRush also includes a supporting liquidity layer, including genesis liquidity, LP staking incentives, and lock-position settlement mechanics. These systems support CLAIM market depth and position mobility, but they are not the primary ownership layer. The primary economic ownership layer remains veCLAIM: Kings create Crown activity, Barons earn from future takeover flow, and LP stakers support the market infrastructure around CLAIM.

ClaimRush is designed as an activity-routed ownership protocol: player-contributed value is routed directly through protocol activity instead of being captured by a treasury, team allocation, or platform fee.

ClaimRush attempts to make future ownership more valuable than immediate exit by routing activity-linked value flow directly to long-term lockers.

ClaimRush should not be understood as creating ETH or net financial value from nothing. Takeover ETH is contributed by players. The protocol design contribution is how that contributed value is routed: atomically, non-custodially, non-discretionarily, without treasury accumulation, and without a platform rake.

Early exit from Furnace locks can result in up to about 99% principal loss - a full-duration lock retains only about 1% of principal on an early exit - depending on remaining lock duration, sell-impact conditions, and the settlement path used.

```
ETH enters through takeovers
↓
Kings receive 75%
Barons receive 25%
↓
Kings mine CLAIM
↓
CLAIM can be locked into veCLAIM
↓
veCLAIM earns from future takeovers
```

Executive Summary

ClaimRush is built around a direct ownership question: if protocol activity routes player-contributed value and the protocol does not capture that value through a treasury or platform fee, who receives it?

In ClaimRush, the answer is the participants.

Kings earn from Crown competition. Barons earn from future Crown activity. LP stakers support market depth. The House, if it participates, does so as a normal player with no privileged economic path.

The protocol’s core experiment is whether future activity exposure can become more valuable than immediate exit. CLAIM can be sold, but CLAIM can also be locked into veCLAIM, converting liquid exposure into a decaying, pro-rata share of future takeover flow. That tradeoff is the center of the ClaimRush economy.

The value source is player willingness to bring ETH into Crown competition. The routing layer is the protocol innovation: value moves inside the activity event instead of being held, governed, or later distributed by a treasury.

Contents

1. Design Philosophy

ClaimRush begins from a simple question:

```
What happens when onchain activity routes contributed value, but the protocol itself does not
take a fee?
```

Most crypto systems route economic value through a protocol treasury, foundation, team-controlled allocation, governance process, or fee switch. ClaimRush takes a different approach.

The protocol defines the rules, but the value contributed through those rules is routed directly to participants.

The design goals are:

```
activity-routed value flow
direct participant routing
long-term activity exposure
transparent mechanics
No protocol extraction
automation compatibility
durable game activity
```

ClaimRush does not try to be a general-purpose DeFi stack. It is intentionally narrow:

```
one game token: CLAIM
one Crown loop
one Furnace loop
one long-term ownership layer: veCLAIM
```

The surface is simple. The meta is deep.

Kings compete for the Crown. Barons lock into the future. The CLAIM stream connects both sides.

In this paper, "activity-routed ownership" means that protocol activity triggers a transparent route for player-contributed value and that long-term participants can receive economic exposure to future activity.

The word "ownership" is used in an economic sense only. veCLAIM does not represent equity, legal ownership, governance control, a residual claim on protocol assets, or a liquidation right. It represents a decaying, conditional, pro-rata claim on future Baron royalty flow while the lock has active ve power.

This distinction is important. ClaimRush is not a company equity model. It is an onchain routing model where locking CLAIM creates exposure to future player-contributed takeover flow.

Definition:
In this paper, “activity-routed ownership” means that protocol activity triggers a transparent route for player-contributed value and that long-term participants can receive economic exposure to future activity. In ClaimRush, Kings create Crown activity, Barons hold exposure to future takeover flow, and LP stakers support market depth.

2. The Core Economy

ClaimRush has two primary player roles:

```
King  = current Crown holder
Baron = veCLAIM holder
```

Kings create activity by competing for the Crown.

Barons earn from future Crown activity by locking CLAIM into veCLAIM and receiving a pro-rata share of takeover flow.

The basic value path is:

```
ETH enters through takeover
↓
75% goes to previous King
25% goes to Barons
↓
King-stream CLAIM is mined
↓
CLAIM can be locked in the Furnace
↓
veCLAIM earns future takeover royalties
```

This structure creates two complementary incentives:

```
Kings want to hold and defend the Crown.
Barons want future Crown activity to continue.
```

The protocol's value flow is therefore not external to the game. It is triggered by the game.

2.1 The Liquidity Support Layer

ClaimRush is primarily organized around two headline roles:

```
King  = current Crown holder
Baron = veCLAIM holder
```

There is also a supporting liquidity layer.

CLAIM trades through an external WETH/CLAIM market, and protocol liquidity is supported through LP infrastructure, including locked genesis liquidity and LP staking rewards. LP stakers are not the central ownership class of the game, but they perform an important supporting function: they help deepen CLAIM liquidity, improve swap execution, and reduce friction for users entering or exiting CLAIM positions.

The LP layer is intentionally separated from the core Crown and Baron economy.

```
Kings create Crown activity.
Barons hold exposure to future takeover flow.
LP stakers support market depth.
```

This distinction matters. ClaimRush is ownership-first, not LP-first. The protocol does not route its main ownership mechanics through gauge wars, bribe markets, or LP-controlled emissions. Liquidity support exists to make the CLAIM market healthier, while the primary long-term ownership layer remains veCLAIM.

2.2 Genesis and Launch Liquidity

ClaimRush starts from zero CLAIM supply.

This creates an important launch problem: the protocol needs a live CLAIM/WETH market for swaps and Furnace entries, but there is no premine, no treasury inventory, and no team allocation from which to seed liquidity.

The v1.0.0 architecture resolves this through a protocol-enforced genesis sequence.

During the genesis window, takeovers are paused while the protocol accrues the initial King-stream CLAIM bucket. After the configured genesis period, a one-shot launch controller finalizes genesis by seeding the initial WETH/CLAIM pool using:

```
50 ETH
+
the materialized genesis CLAIM bucket
```

This initial liquidity is then locked for 24 months in the GenesisLPVault24M.

This design is trust-relevant for three reasons.

- First, it shows how the initial CLAIM market can exist without a premine or arbitrary treasury allocation.
- Second, the genesis liquidity source is constrained by the protocol sequence rather than discretionary token distribution.
- Third, the LP lock makes the initial liquidity commitment visible and time-bound.

The genesis sequence is not a normal reign. It is a launch bootstrap path that creates the first market for CLAIM while preserving the claim that protocol supply starts from zero and is produced by the rules of the system.

After launch, the liquidity layer continues through the CLAIM/WETH market, LP staking infrastructure, and LP reward flows. These systems support market depth and swap execution, but they do not replace the central Crown and Baron economy.

3. The Crown Loop

The Crown loop is the active competition layer.

A player pays ETH to take the Crown and become King. While King, the player mines CLAIM through the Crown emission stream.

When another player takes the Crown, the previous reign is finalized. The previous King receives:

```
75% of the new takeover ETH
+
CLAIM mined during the completed reign, settled per Section 3.1 as a liquid slice and a force-locked veCLAIM remainder
```

The new player becomes King, and the next reign begins.

The takeover price is not fixed. After each successful takeover, the reference price doubles from the price actually paid. From there, the current takeover price decays linearly over a one-hour decay window.

More precisely, the price decays toward zero over the decay window and is then clamped at the protocol floor:

```
price = max(floor, referencePrice x (1 - elapsed / decayPeriod))
```

This means the price does not directly decay toward the floor. It decays toward zero, but the floor prevents it from falling below the minimum takeover price.

This creates a clear rhythm:

```
early reign
→ higher takeover cost

later reign
→ lower takeover cost

after sufficient decay
→ floor-priced takeover
```

The result is a simple timing game: high-cost takeovers signal urgency and competition, while low-cost takeovers create calmer re-entry windows when attention is lower.

ClaimRush is a game of skill and strategy, not chance. Outcomes are determined by players' decisions, timing, and competition. There is no random number generator, no lottery draw, and no house-edge wager. This places ClaimRush closer to competitive strategy and king-of-the-hill games than to a casino.

The Crown loop creates a public rhythm:

```
take Crown
hold Crown
mine CLAIM
get dethroned
receive ETH
repeat
```

Every takeover also funds Barons, because 25% of takeover ETH routes to veCLAIM holders.

This means the Crown is not only a status object. It is the entry point of the entire ClaimRush economy.

3.1 King-Stream Settlement: Liquid Share and Force-Locking

When a King is dethroned, the CLAIM mined during the reign is not paid out as fully liquid CLAIM. It is split into two parts:

- a liquid slice, minted directly to the reign's CLAIM recipient (default: the King's wallet)
- a force-locked remainder, routed through the Furnace into a veCLAIM position

Variable lock ratio. The liquid fraction is not fixed. It equals the King's share of the last 100 takeovers, capped at one half:

```
liquidShare = min(takeoversByThisKingInLast100 / 100, 50%)
lockedShare = 1 - liquidShare
```

Each takeover a King holds in the trailing 100-takeover window adds one percentage point of liquid share. A player who performed 20 of the last 100 takeovers receives 20% of their mined CLAIM as liquid CLAIM and 80% force-locked. The share is keyed to the King's identity - the player who earned it - while the payout follows the reign's CLAIM recipient.

King's share of last 100 takeovers	Liquid CLAIM	Force-locked veCLAIM
First reign (1 of 100)	1%	99%
20 of 100	20%	80%
50 of 100 (or more)	50% (capped)	50%

A first-time King therefore receives almost entirely locked veCLAIM; liquidity is earned only by sustained Crown competition. Passive or one-time players exit a reign with committed ownership, not liquid CLAIM.

The force-lock target. The locked remainder is placed into an auto-rolling, maximum-duration veCLAIM lock (an AutoMax lock) and consolidated into a single pinned position per King, so repeated reigns do not fragment a player's holdings. A King may direct the locked remainder into a different existing lock they already own.

Why force-locked. A full-duration lock retains only about 1% of principal on an early exit (see Sections 4 and 14). Force-locking the bulk of mined CLAIM decouples the Crown takeover price from the spot CLAIM price: a King cannot mine CLAIM, sell it, and profit, because the majority of the reward is locked and lossy to exit. Takeover cost is driven by competition for the Crown, not by the immediate resale value of mined CLAIM.

Why the cap holds. After each takeover, the reference price doubles from the price actually paid (see Section 3), so re-taking one's own Crown is uneconomical and players must ping-pong the Crown between rivals. With no cheap self-succession, a single address can hold at most about 50 of the last 100 takeovers, so the liquid share tops out near one half in normal play; the on-chain 50% clamp guarantees that bound even in degenerate low-activity windows.

If a lock mint cannot be completed at settlement, the locked remainder is credited to the King as a pending balance that can only be withdrawn into a lock, so the force-lock guarantee is never bypassed and settlement never blocks the next reign.

4. The Furnace Loop

The Furnace loop is the long-term ownership layer.

Players can lock CLAIM into the Furnace and receive veCLAIM. veCLAIM represents royalty-earning power inside the protocol.

Barons earn from future activity:

```
every takeover
↓
25% of takeover ETH
↓
distributed to veCLAIM holders
weighted by veCLAIM share
```

This makes veCLAIM different from ordinary staking.

In many staking systems, rewards come mainly from inflation.

In ClaimRush, Baron royalties come from Crown activity.

The Furnace therefore converts CLAIM from a liquid game token into a forward-looking ownership position.

```
CLAIM   = liquid game asset
veCLAIM = locked ownership power
```

This paper describes the Furnace at the ownership-layer level. The implementation is more detailed. The Furnace includes a shared bonus engine, duration-sensitive locking behavior, reserve dynamics, sellback and listing mechanics for lock positions, and routing paths for ETH, CLAIM, and selected entry assets. These details exist to make locking, compounding, liquidity support, and position exits work inside one coherent system. The high-level economic role remains simple: the Furnace converts CLAIM into veCLAIM, and veCLAIM earns from future takeover activity. Early exit from Furnace locks can result in up to about 99% principal loss - a full-duration lock retains only about 1% of principal on an early exit - depending on remaining lock duration, sell-impact conditions, and the settlement path used.

5. CLAIM and veCLAIM

ClaimRush uses one game token:

```
CLAIM
```

CLAIM is produced by protocol emissions. The primary stream is mined by Kings during reigns. A secondary Furnace stream funds the shared Furnace reserve and lock bonus system.

veCLAIM is the locked form of CLAIM.

The key properties are:

```
more CLAIM locked
→ more veCLAIM

more time remaining
→ more veCLAIM

more veCLAIM share
→ larger share of Baron royalties
```

This makes CLAIM and veCLAIM serve different roles.

CLAIM is liquid exposure to the game.

veCLAIM is committed exposure to future activity.

The distinction matters because ClaimRush is not only designed around buying and selling CLAIM. It is designed around converting CLAIM into long-term participation.

5.1 veCLAIM Dilution, Decay, and Maintenance

veCLAIM is not a fixed-return instrument.

A Baron’s royalty share depends on their share of total veCLAIM:

```
user royalty share
=
user veCLAIM / total veCLAIM
```

The royalty per unit of veCLAIM depends on two moving variables:

```
takeover ETH flow
÷
total veCLAIM
```

This means the ownership layer is competitive.

If more participants lock CLAIM into veCLAIM, total veCLAIM increases. Unless takeover activity increases at the same pace, each existing Baron’s share of future royalties can be diluted.

This is not a bug. It is the ownership market.

Participants compete for future royalty share by locking CLAIM, extending locks, compounding royalties, and maintaining duration.

veCLAIM also decays over time.

The core relationship is:

```
veCLAIM = locked CLAIM x remaining duration / max duration
```

A lock with less time remaining has less ve power than the same amount of CLAIM locked for the maximum duration.

For example:

```
1,000 CLAIM locked for 365 days
→ approximately 1,000 veCLAIM at creation

1,000 CLAIM with 182.5 days remaining
→ approximately 500 veCLAIM

1,000 CLAIM near expiry
→ approaches 0 veCLAIM
```

This means holding royalty share requires maintenance.

A passive lock naturally loses ve power as time passes. A participant who wants to preserve royalty share can extend manually, enable AutoMax so duration maintenance is automatic, compound royalties, or use other lock-management actions.

This is one reason automation exists in the protocol.

Delegated participation is not only a convenience layer. For long-term participants, automation can help maintain economic exposure by managing recurring actions such as royalty collection, compounding, lock extension, and position upkeep.

Automation does not remove risk and does not guarantee returns. It simply gives participants tools to manage a system where ownership share changes over time.

6. Why No Treasury Matters

One of the most important design choices in ClaimRush is the absence of protocol extraction.

The protocol is designed around:

```
no premine
no team allocation
no investor allocation
no protocol fee on takeovers
no treasury rake
fixed 75% / 25% takeover split
```

This changes the value-routing model.

In a typical protocol:

```
users create activity and contribute value
↓
protocol collects fees
↓
treasury captures value
↓
token holders depend on governance or future distribution
```

In ClaimRush:

```
players create activity and contribute ETH
↓
takeover ETH enters
↓
Kings and Barons receive the value directly
```

There is no treasury step that later decides how takeover value should be distributed. The value route is embedded in the activity mechanics.

This is why ClaimRush can be described as an activity-routed ownership protocol, with the term understood precisely:

> **Core idea:**
>
> Player activity contributes value flow, and the protocol routes that flow directly to active and long-term participants.

The protocol does not hold the flow.

Participants receive the flow according to transparent rules.

6.1 The House Model and the No-Treasury Tradeoff

ClaimRush does not use a protocol treasury, premine, platform rake, or team allocation as the primary economic capture mechanism.

This raises an obvious question:

```
If the protocol does not take a cut,
how is long-term operation aligned?
```

This question should be treated as a real design tradeoff, not ignored.

No treasury removes a major capture surface: there is no fee pool to raid, no DAO-controlled bucket to misallocate, no fee switch to politicize, and no protocol balance that must later be governed into a distribution model.

But no treasury also removes a native funding pool for audits, bug bounties, infrastructure, frontends, indexers, market support, incident response, crisis liquidity, and long-term development. ClaimRush chooses credible neutrality over treasury-funded continuity.

ClaimRush answers this through the House model.

The House is the developer-controlled onchain participant. It is not a treasury. It is not a fee receiver. It is not a privileged protocol account.

The House participates under the same public rules as every other player.

It may:

```
buy CLAIM
sell CLAIM
lock CLAIM
unlock CLAIM
provide liquidity
take the Crown
defend the Crown
compound rewards
stop participating
```

The important distinction is that the House has no special economic path.

```
The House does not receive a protocol fee.
The House does not receive a premine.
The House does not receive a team allocation.
The House does not bypass takeover mechanics.
The House does not bypass lock decay.
The House does not bypass liquidity risk.
The House does not receive private royalty routing.
```

The House should not be confused with admin or guardian roles. The House is a player address, not a governance role. It has no privileged hooks, no dev-only execution path, and no special claim on protocol value.

Any operator upside comes from participating in the same game economy as everyone else.

This reframes the no-treasury model as an explicit alignment tradeoff rather than a claim that ongoing operation is costless.

In a treasury-centered model, the operator may be funded by protocol extraction or discretionary treasury spending.

In ClaimRush, the operator is economically exposed to the same public system:

```
same CLAIM market
same Crown mechanics
same veCLAIM ownership layer
same liquidity risk
```

```
same lock mechanics
same onchain visibility
```

This does not eliminate risk, and it does not create a guaranteed funding source.

The House may sell CLAIM. The House may change its participation level. The House does not make forward-looking commitments about timing, size, strategy, or intent. Participants should not assume House behavior will support CLAIM price, liquidity, royalties, or Crown activity.

The trust claim is narrower and more precise:

```
The House has no privileged extraction path.
Its actions are discoverable onchain.
It participates as a player, not as a fee-taking treasury.
```

This is a key part of ClaimRush's activity-routed ownership design.

7. Long-Term Ownership vs. Short-Term Exit

A central design goal of ClaimRush is to make long-term ownership economically meaningful.

In many token systems, large holders face a simple incentive problem:

```
hold an asset with uncertain future utility
or
sell into available market liquidity
```

When the best risk-adjusted option is to sell, large holders become a persistent overhang. Even if they believe in the project, the token structure may not reward them enough for staying.

ClaimRush attempts to create a different incentive.

A participant who locks CLAIM into veCLAIM is no longer exposed only to the liquid market price of CLAIM. The participant also becomes exposed to future Crown activity through the Baron royalty layer.

As long as takeovers continue, veCLAIM holders receive a proportional share of takeover ETH.

This creates a different economic comparison:

```
short-term exit value
=
the value available by selling CLAIM today

long-term activity exposure value
=
future Baron royalties
+
compounding potential
+
continued exposure to future player-contributed Crown activity
+
remaining value of the lock position
```

The protocol cannot force any participant to stay. CLAIM can fall in price, activity can decline, royalties can shrink, liquidity can weaken, and any participant may still decide to exit.

But ClaimRush is designed so that long-term activity exposure can become more attractive than short-term liquidation when future player-contributed activity is valuable and persistent.

That is the intended alignment:

```
if the game grows
→ long-term lockers benefit

if Crown activity increases
→ Barons benefit

if royalties compound
→ ownership can deepen over time
```

This is the difference between holding a token and owning exposure to future activity.

A short-term holder asks:

```
What can I sell this for today?
```

A long-term Baron asks:

```
What future activity flow am I exposed to by staying locked?
```

ClaimRush does not eliminate sell pressure. No permissionless protocol can guarantee that.

Instead, it tries to change the dominant incentive for committed participants:

```
selling exits the machine
locking owns exposure to the machine
```

This is one of the core ideas behind ClaimRush as an activity-routed ownership protocol.

This does not make a closed game financially positive-sum by itself. Takeover ETH is supplied by players. Before gas, slippage, and other costs, the financial layer redistributes contributed value. The activity-routed ownership thesis is about clean routing, long-term exposure, and incentive alignment.

The value question is therefore explicit: why do players choose to bring ETH into Crown competition? The answer may include strategy, status, entertainment, future flow exposure, and market belief. If that willingness disappears, royalty flow can disappear immediately.

7.1 Illustrative Ownership Scenarios

The long-term ownership thesis can be expressed with a simple model.

Assume:

```
N = number of takeovers per day
P = average takeover price in ETH
S = Baron’s share of total veCLAIM
D = number of days
```

Each takeover routes 25% of paid ETH to Barons.

A Baron’s royalty income over D days is approximately:

```
royalties = N x P x 25% x S x D
```

This is not a forecast. It is an illustrative formula showing how takeover activity, average price, and veCLAIM share interact.

Example: 1% veCLAIM share

Assume a Baron controls 1% of total veCLAIM.

Scenario	Takeovers / day	Avg takeover price	Daily royalties	30d royalties	365d royalties
Low activity	12	0.05 ETH	0.0015 ETH	0.045 ETH	0.55 ETH
Medium activity	24	0.25 ETH	0.015 ETH	0.45 ETH	5.48 ETH
High activity	48	1.00 ETH	0.12 ETH	3.60 ETH	43.80 ETH

For a Baron with 10% of total veCLAIM, the figures above are multiplied by 10.

Breakeven illustration

A participant comparing short-term exit against long-term ownership can estimate a royalty-only breakeven period:

```
breakeven days
=
current exit value in ETH
÷
daily royalty ETH
```

For example, consider two independent illustrative inputs: a participant could sell liquid CLAIM today for 10 ETH, and a separate locked-position assumption could control 1% of total veCLAIM. These inputs are not derived from each other. Under those assumptions, the royalty-only breakeven period would be:

Scenario	Daily royalties	Royalty-only breakeven on 10 ETH
Low activity	0.0015 ETH	approx. 6,667 days
Medium activity	0.015 ETH	approx. 667 days
High activity	0.12 ETH	approx. 83 days

This illustration excludes:

```
CLAIM price changes
lock-position resale value
structured sellback penalties or spreads, including possible forfeiture of up to about 99% of principal on early exit (retaining about 1% at full duration), depending on remaining duration and sell-impact conditions
slippage
gas
MEV
tax effects
veCLAIM dilution
veCLAIM decay
changes in takeover frequency
changes in average takeover price
```

The point is not that locking always beats selling.

The point is that ClaimRush makes the comparison explicit:

```
exit today
vs.
own future activity
```

When takeover activity is weak, immediate exit may dominate.

When takeover activity is strong and persistent, long-term ownership can become economically meaningful.

This is the activity-routed ownership thesis in measurable form.

7.2 Emission Decay and Ownership Over Time

ClaimRush emissions are designed to be meaningful early and durable over time.

At launch, the combined CLAIM emission rate is:

```
King stream:      50 CLAIM / second
Furnace stream:    5 CLAIM / second
Total:            55 CLAIM / second
```

Over the first two years, both streams decay linearly toward their long-term floor.

After two years, the permanent tail is:

```
King stream:      50/9 CLAIM / second
Furnace stream:    5/9 CLAIM / second
Total:            55/9 CLAIM / second
```

Approximate daily emissions:

Period	King stream / day	Furnace stream / day	Total / day
Launch	4,320,000 CLAIM	432,000 CLAIM	4,752,000 CLAIM
2-year floor	480,000 CLAIM	48,000 CLAIM	528,000 CLAIM



Figure 1. Illustrative CLAIM emission decay. The chart shows the linear decline from launch emissions to the two-year floor, followed by the permanent tail.

The decay shape matters.

Early emissions create intensity. Later emissions preserve the game's ability to continue without a hard end date.

This also changes the ownership competition over time.

During the high-emission phase, new CLAIM can enter circulation quickly. Participants compete to decide whether that CLAIM remains liquid, is sold, is locked, or is compounded into future veCLAIM ownership.

As emissions decline, future ownership increasingly depends on:

```
existing locked supply
automatic lock-duration maintenance through AutoMax
compounding behavior
takeover activity
liquidity depth
```

The result is a gradual transition:

```
early game
→ emission-driven accumulation

later game
→ ownership-driven participation

tail phase
→ durable but lower-emission Crown activity
```

This paper does not forecast the future supply distribution of CLAIM. It only identifies the mechanism: as emissions decay, the importance of locked ownership, compounding, and sustained Crown activity increases.

8. Compounding as Protocol Memory

Each takeover is not isolated.

A takeover can:

```
dethrone a King
```

```
settle mined CLAIM
pay ETH to the previous King
pay ETH to Barons
create royalty ETH that can be compounded
increase future veCLAIM ownership
```

This means activity can become protocol memory.

The sequence is:

```
takeover
↓
royalty
↓
Collect & Lock
↓
more veCLAIM
↓
larger future royalty share
```

The protocol's past activity can become future ownership through compounding.

This design gives ClaimRush a memory layer that is economic, not only historical.

Every Crown war leaves traces in the ownership layer.

9. Automation and Delegated Participation

ClaimRush supports optional automation through delegated sessions.

Delegation allows a user to grant a bot or contract limited permission to perform specific actions on the user's behalf.

Delegated participation can support:

```
takeovers
royalty collection
Furnace entries
lock extension
lock maintenance
auto-compound configuration
expired lock unlocks
```

This matters because ClaimRush is not only built for manual interaction. It is also built for recurring participation.

A manual player can click buttons.

A long-term participant may want recurring operations:

```
monitor Crown
take action
collect royalties
compound
extend locks
maintain position
```

Automation is not required to use ClaimRush. But it is an important protocol surface because long-term ownership often benefits from consistency.

Delegated sessions should remain:

```
opt-in
permission-scoped
time-limited
revocable
observable
separate from broad token-spending approvals
```

Automation is useful, but security-sensitive. Users should understand what each permission allows, when it expires, and how to revoke it.

10. Activity-Routed Ownership Protocols

ClaimRush can be understood as part of a broader design category:

Activity-routed ownership protocols are systems where recurring onchain activity routes participant-contributed value directly to long-term onchain participants rather than to a central treasury. The term describes value routing and economic exposure, not legal ownership.

Definition:
Activity-routed ownership protocols are systems where recurring onchain activity routes participant-contributed value directly to long-term onchain participants rather than to a central treasury. The term describes value routing and economic exposure, not legal ownership.

ClaimRush is one implementation of this pattern.

Its activity is Crown competition.

Its value flow is takeover ETH.

Its ownership layer is veCLAIM.

Its participants are Kings and Barons.

The pattern is:

```
activity
↓
value flow
↓
long-term activity exposure
```

This creates a different mental model from typical token systems.

The model is only as strong as its value source. If the underlying activity has durable demand, treasury-free routing can be powerful. If the activity weakens, there is no treasury buffer that can manufacture flow.

In ClaimRush specifically, the value source is player-contributed takeover ETH. The protocol innovation is that it routes this ETH without custody, discretion, or central extraction.

Instead of asking:

```
What does the treasury do with protocol revenue?
```

ClaimRush asks:

```
Who locked into future activity?
```

That is the ownership question at the center of the protocol.

11. Comparative Design

ClaimRush combines familiar crypto components in an unusual way. The individual parts are not all new. The design difference is how they are connected.

ve and gauge-bribe systems

Many ve-token systems use locked tokens to direct emissions through gauges, bribes, or voting markets.

ClaimRush does not use a ve(3,3) gauge-bribe model.

There are no gauge wars for directing CLAIM emissions. There are no bribe markets that determine where core rewards flow. The main ownership layer is simpler:

```
lock CLAIM
→ receive veCLAIM
→ earn a share of takeover ETH
```

The protocol does not ask Barons to vote on where emissions go. It asks whether they want exposure to future Crown activity.

Real-yield staking

Real-yield systems often distribute protocol revenue or fees to stakers.

ClaimRush is different because the protocol itself does not take a platform fee and then redistribute it.

Instead:

```
takeover ETH enters
↓
75% routes to the previous King
25% routes to Barons
```

The value flow is embedded directly into the gameplay event.

Barons do not receive yield from a treasury. They receive their share of player-contributed Crown activity flow.

Last-buyer and king-of-the-hill games

Onchain king-of-the-hill and last-buyer games usually focus on short-term competition, jackpots, timing games, or terminal payout moments.

ClaimRush uses a king-of-the-hill surface, but it is not only a last-buyer game.

The Crown loop creates activity and routes takeover ETH.

The Furnace loop converts that activity into long-term ownership.

There is no hard end-of-game date. The design includes decaying emissions and a permanent tail so that the game can continue beyond the initial high-intensity phase.

Treasury-centered protocols

Many protocols route value through a treasury, foundation, DAO, or fee switch.

ClaimRush routes takeover value directly to players and lockers.

This makes the ownership question more explicit:

```
Who created activity?
Who locked into future activity?
Who owns the future flow?
```

The answer is not a treasury. The answer is the participants.

12. Concentration, Visibility, and Permissionless Ownership

ClaimRush is permissionless.

It does not attempt to eliminate all concentration. In open crypto systems, address-level anti-concentration rules can often be bypassed by splitting activity across many wallets.

Instead, ClaimRush emphasizes observable, rule-based ownership.

The key economic variable is not identity. It is veCLAIM share.

```
veCLAIM share
=
```

```
share of Baron royalty payouts
```

That makes ownership transparent at the protocol layer.

Concentration can create risks:

```
one participant or group may earn a large share of royalties
social trust may depend on large-participant behavior
smaller participants may perceive the ownership layer as hard to enter
the market may discount highly concentrated systems
```

Concentration is a risk, but it is not automatically the same as extraction. In ClaimRush, a large locked participant is economically exposed to future Crown activity. If that participant remains locked and continues to support the system, their incentives may become more similar to an operator or long-term owner than to a short-term seller.

ClaimRush does not rely on identity-based ownership limits.

It relies on:

```
transparent rules
locked positions
observable activity
future economic exposure
```

The health of the protocol should therefore be evaluated through public metrics, not assumptions about identity.

13. Finality and Trust Boundaries

Activity-routed ownership systems require trust in the machine.

Participants need to understand:

```
What can change?
Who can change it?
When can it change?
What becomes permanent?
What remains operationally mutable?
```

ClaimRush separates these questions through public documentation of governance state, pause controls, upgradeability, and finality.

The protocol’s trust model should be evaluated across two phases:

Pre-finality

During the launch and early runtime phase, some contracts may be patchable through governed upgrade processes.

This allows critical issues to be fixed, but it also creates trust assumptions.

Participants should understand:

```
which contracts are upgradeable
who controls upgrades
what timelocks apply
what emergency controls exist
```

Post-finality

After the freeze-and-burn ceremony, core runtime upgrade authority is removed for the finalized runtime contracts.

This creates a stronger trust boundary:

```
core runtime code becomes permanent
canonical addresses remain live
future trust shifts from governance to immutable rules
```

Finality matters because long-term ownership requires confidence that the machine will not be rewritten after participants have locked into it.

14. Risk Model

ClaimRush is risky.

The protocol's mechanics may be interesting, but participation is not safe by default.

Game risk

Crown activity can increase or decrease. Reigns, takeovers, royalties, and lock demand depend on participant behavior.

ClaimRush does not create ETH. ETH flow depends on players choosing to bring ETH into takeovers. If willingness to pay for Crown competition declines, Baron royalties can decline or stop immediately.

Token price risk

CLAIM can fall in price. A lock can lose value even if it earns royalties.

Royalty risk

Baron royalties are variable and backward-looking. Past royalty activity does not guarantee future royalty activity.

Lockup risk

Locked CLAIM is not instantly withdrawable. Exiting may require waiting for expiry, listing a lock, or using protocol-defined settlement paths. Early exit from Furnace locks can result in up to about 99% principal loss - a full-duration lock retains only about 1% of principal on an early exit - depending on remaining lock duration, sell-impact conditions, and the settlement path used.

Liquidity risk

CLAIM liquidity can be thin. Swaps can experience price impact, slippage, MEV, failed transactions, or unfavorable execution.

Compounding execution risk

Compounding paths can involve swaps. Collect & Lock, auto-compound, and other Furnace routes may be exposed to execution risk, including slippage, price impact, failed transactions, MEV, stale quotes, routing errors, gas spikes, or unfavorable market movement between quote and execution.

Automation risk

Delegated sessions can be useful but are security-sensitive. Some permissions can route value. Users should understand delegate addresses, permissions, expiry, revocation, and transaction effects.

Smart-contract risk

Contracts can contain bugs. External dependencies, DEX routes, RPC providers, indexers, keepers, frontends, and wallets can fail or behave unexpectedly.

Governance and finality risk

Before finality, some core contracts may remain patchable. After finality, the core runtime may become non-upgradeable, reducing governance risk but increasing immutability risk.

Concentration risk

A large veCLAIM holder can receive a large share of royalties. This may create social, liquidity, and perception risk.

Regulatory and eligibility risk

ClaimRush is a paid onchain game. Users are responsible for determining whether participation is legal in their jurisdiction and appropriate for their circumstances.

15. What ClaimRush Is Not

ClaimRush should not be described as:

```
guaranteed yield
passive income without risk
an investment contract
a fixed APY product
a treasury-backed revenue share
a promise of profit
a risk-free staking system
a casino, lottery, or other game of chance
equity, legal ownership, or a residual claim on protocol assets
a system with guaranteed external revenue
a complete description of every Furnace, LP, routing, marketplace, keeper, or lock-settlement
parameter
```

ClaimRush is better described as:

```
a paid onchain Crown game
with direct participant value flow
and a long-term locked royalty layer
```

This distinction matters.

Royalties come from activity. Activity is uncertain. Future outcomes are not guaranteed.

This paper describes the protocol at the activity-routed ownership design level. Implementation-specific parameters, routing details, liquidity incentives, marketplace mechanics, and contract-level behavior should be read together with the technical specification and developer documentation.

The term ownership in this document refers to economic exposure to future activity through veCLAIM. It does not refer to legal ownership, shareholder rights, governance control, or a permanent claim on protocol assets.

16. Protocol Health Metrics

ClaimRush should be evaluated through observable metrics rather than slogans.

Crown activity

```
current King
current takeover price
recent reigns
takeover count
takeover ETH volume
average reign duration
average takeover price
King-stream CLAIM mined
```

Baron ownership

```
total veCLAIM
total locked CLAIM
locked percentage of supply
average lock duration
top veCLAIM concentration
new locks
lock extensions
Collect & Lock volume
```

Royalty flow

```
24h Baron royalties
7d Baron royalties
30d Baron royalties
collected royalties
compounded royalties
royalty distribution by ve share
```

Liquidity

```
CLAIM liquidity
LP depth
swap price impact
LP vault participation
LP rewards
```

Automation

```
active delegated sessions
delegated takeovers
delegated royalty collection
delegated lock maintenance
session revocations
failed delegated calls
```

Trust and safety

```
pause status
finality status
live contract addresses
governance timelock state
known incidents
security page verification
```

> Observability objective:
>
> Make the value-routing machine observable.

17. Long-Term Thesis

ClaimRush is an experiment in companyless economic exposure to protocol activity.

There is no traditional company collecting takeover fees. There is no treasury accumulating the flow. There is no premine assigning ownership-like exposure before play begins.

Instead, economic exposure emerges through activity and locking.

The long-term thesis is:

```
players create activity and contribute ETH
activity routes contributed value
value flow routes to Kings and Barons
Barons lock into future activity
future flow becomes economically exposed to those willing to commit to the system
```

This is why ClaimRush matters as a design experiment.

Not because every participant will win.

Not because activity is guaranteed.

Not because royalties are fixed.

But because the protocol asks a serious crypto design question:

```
Can an onchain system create economic exposure to future activity without routing value
through a company or treasury?
```

ClaimRush is one attempt at that answer.

The answer depends on whether players continue to find the Crown activity worth funding. Treasury-free routing is a powerful design constraint, but it does not replace the need for durable demand.

18. Conclusion

ClaimRush is a Crown game on the surface.

Underneath, it is an activity-routed ownership protocol.

Its design is simple:

```
ETH enters through competition.
CLAIM is produced by reigns.
CLAIM can be locked into veCLAIM.
veCLAIM earns from future competition.
The protocol takes no platform fee.
The treasury does not capture the flow.
Participants receive exposure to the activity flow they fund and lock into.
```

The result is a system where long-term participants are not merely staking for emissions. They are locking into a decaying, pro-rata exposure to future game activity.

That is the core idea.

The central experiment is whether a protocol can make future activity exposure more valuable than immediate exit.

ClaimRush attempts this by connecting locked CLAIM directly to future player-contributed takeover flow.

If the answer is yes, ClaimRush is not only a Crown game. It is a test of whether crypto can create durable economic exposure to future activity without a company, a treasury, or a central value extractor.

Final frame:
An activity-routed ownership Crown economy where value is contributed through play and routed to long-term participants.

19. Glossary

CLAIM: The native ERC-20 token of ClaimRush. CLAIM is mined through protocol emissions and can be used in the Furnace to create veCLAIM.

Crown: The central game object. The player who holds the Crown is the King.

King: The current Crown holder. The King mines CLAIM while holding the Crown and receives 75% of the next takeover ETH when dethroned.

Takeover: The act of paying ETH to take the Crown from the current King.

Baron: A veCLAIM holder. Barons earn from the 25% royalty share of every takeover ETH.

Furnace: The protocol system used to lock CLAIM, create veCLAIM, and access the shared bonus engine.

veCLAIM: The locked economic exposure unit of ClaimRush. A user’s share of total veCLAIM determines their share of Baron royalties while the lock has active ve power. veCLAIM is not equity, legal ownership, governance control, or a residual claim on protocol assets.

Royalty: The 25% portion of takeover ETH distributed to veCLAIM holders.

Collect & Lock: A compounding path where royalty ETH is routed back through the Furnace into more locked CLAIM and veCLAIM.

House: The developer-controlled onchain participant in ClaimRush. The House may participate as a normal player but has no special economic path, no protocol fee claim, no premine, no private execution path, and no privileged royalty route. Its actions are discoverable onchain and subject to the same public rules as other participants.

Activity-Routed Ownership Protocol: A protocol where recurring activity routes participant-contributed value directly to long-term onchain participants rather than to a central treasury. The term refers to economic exposure and value routing, not legal ownership.

Long-Term Ownership: An economic position where future activity exposure, compounding potential, and locked participation may be more valuable than immediate liquidation. It does not imply equity ownership, governance control, or a permanent claim on assets.

Value Flow: Player-contributed ETH routed through protocol activity according to fixed rules. In ClaimRush, takeover ETH is the primary value flow: 75% routes to the previous King and 25% routes to Barons.

Liquid share: The fraction of a dethroned King's mined CLAIM paid as liquid CLAIM. Equal to the King's share of the last 100 takeovers, capped at 50%.

Force-lock: On dethrone, the non-liquid remainder of mined CLAIM is automatically locked into an auto-rolling, maximum-duration veCLAIM position rather than paid as liquid CLAIM.

Takeover window: The trailing set of the last 100 takeovers used to size each King's liquid share at settlement.

20. References

ClaimRush user documentation: https://docs.claimru.sh/

ClaimRush Core Concepts: https://docs.claimru.sh/core-concepts/

ClaimRush Safety and Risk: https://docs.claimru.sh/safety-and-risk/

ClaimRush developer documentation: https://developers.claimru.sh/

Protocol Overview: https://developers.claimru.sh/protocol-overview/

Core Mechanics: https://developers.claimru.sh/core-mechanics/

DelegationHub: https://developers.claimru.sh/delegationhub/

Freeze-and-Burn Finality: https://developers.claimru.sh/freeze-and-burn-finality/

House Charter: https://developers.claimru.sh/house-charter/

ClaimRush v1.0.0 Architecture Reference: https://github.com/claimrush/claimrush/blob/main/docs/architecture/architecture-reference-v1.0.0.md